Review of Field Marshal Von Manstein’s book, The Janus Head, A Portrait

Few would dispute the claim that Erich von Manstein ranked among the best operational-level military commanders of World War II, if not the best. However, due to Manstein’s decisions during and after the war, he is also among the most controversial figures of the war. However, despite Manstein’s central role in the war, no official biography has been written about him. On Field Marshal von Manstein, the head of Janus, a portrait Noted military historian Marcel Stein addresses this gap in war research. In doing so, Stein has pierced the heart of enduring myths regarding Manstein and his role in the war. In addition, Stein also broadened the scope of his work and skillfully explained the general moral decline of the German General Staff, involvement in the Holocaust, and the central place in mismanagement of the German war effort.

Manstein stood as a symbol of everything that explained the incredible tactical and operational military prowess of the German Wermacht during the war, and its moral depravity. Perhaps the most important value that Stein’s work provides to the military history enthusiast, among many, is how Stein links his discussion of Manstein to broader themes that mark the War and how we have come to remember it.

For example, Stein uses Manstein as a vehicle to explain how deeply involved the German General Staff and field commanders were in the Holocaust; as well as how they selfishly shaped a wildly inaccurate picture of war. Stein regularly strays from his discussion of Manstein’s career to explain how the German officer corps’ adoption of National Socialist ideology tainted a centuries-old tradition of military excellence. As a result, although the Third Reich was able to draw on a much more talented officer corps than Imperial Germany possessed in World War I, the characteristic criminal behavior of the Wermacht officer corps played a central role in the destruction of the Third Reich. .

Stein demonstrates how Hitler’s best military leaders, men like Manstein, sometimes won staggering victories but, perhaps as a result, they constantly underestimated and misinterpreted the strength and power of a Red Army that ultimately played the central role in the destruction. of the National Socialist experiment. For example, and, for one thing, Manstein was an operational genius. He was the author of the plan that defeated the combined force of the British, French, Belgian and Dutch armies in a few weeks. Whereas only twenty years before and after four years of war, Imperial Germany had not done the same. Furthermore, Manstein’s leadership of a Motorized Corps during Barbarossa’s first months clearly established him as one of the best large mobile unit leaders of the War. Manstein added to this reputation when, in early 1943, he launched a counterattack so impressive that it brought the growing Red Army to its heels. Manstein’s counteroffensive, despite the fact that it had followed the Red Army’s greatest success to date in the war, convinced Zhukov and Stalin that they needed to muster the available Red Army force to take a defensive position later that year and postpone his plans to take the offensive until after the anticipated German summer offensive at Kursk.

The events at Kursk would prove critical in understanding the link between Manstein’s failures and the mistakes made by his peers in the upper ranks of the German officer corps. At Kursk, one of the two elements explaining Manstein’s often-ignored shortcomings as a military leader was perhaps better revealed; his monumental arrogance and consequent inability to admit when he had made a mistake. Manstein’s arrogant approach to fighting the Red Army was central to the events in Kursk. Manstein played a central role in convincing Hitler to launch the Operational Citadel despite the fact that the Red Army had turned the Kursk salient into one of the strongest fortresses in the world; a fact of which the Germans were well aware. Then, after the Citadel failed to achieve its stated goals, Manstein ignored reality and pushed for the offensive to continue. Manstein later did not take responsibility for the failure of the Citadel even as the Red Army launched its own summer offensive and brought several German armies to the breaking point.

Manstein’s second great flaw, as regards his military leadership, was his naked ambition and the concomitant desire to head the German General Staff; an ambition that featured prominently on numerous occasions during the war. Manstein’s ambition was most spectacularly revealed in his repeated attempts to cover up his own mistakes. A command failure most often revealed during his leadership of the 11th Army and Army Group Don; when in both cases he avoided making critical decisions. For example, in his role as commander of Army Group Don, Manstein refused to make a decision apparently his own and did not issue an unequivocal escape order from the pocket of Stalingrad; an order that may have saved part of the surrounded German Sixth Army. Manstein’s lack of courage when it came to circumventing Hitler’s orders demonstrated how Manstein put his own professional goals first; Moral cowardice was an integral part of his leadership style. Furthermore, Manstein used to throw his subordinates to the wolves; apparently out of fear of Hitler’s wrath even though many other high ranking German military leaders would ignore Hitler’s orders during the war and come out relatively unscathed despite their transgressions. These men, like Hausser and Model, at important times in the war put their men first, although it could have spelled the end of their careers.

Manstein was more than emblematic of the successes and failures of the German army on the battlefield. Stein also helps the reader understand the latent anti-Semitism and racism that permeated the German officer corps during the war by exploring Manstein’s regular involvement in the genocide that defined Wermacht’s campaign in Eastern Europe. Stein’s findings help illustrate the criminal depravity of the German officer corps by not only ignoring the laws of war, but assisting with the genocide of millions of innocent Slavs, Jews, Gypsies, and other human beings.

In addition, Stein also examines how Manstein’s follow-up to the War led the way in reshaping the historiography of the War. Under the influence of Manstein, this historiography grew out of an image and a myth created by the main German military figures who survived the war. This myth, sadly, has held up surprisingly well over time. A myth that has led millions to believe that the Wermacht did not participate in the genocide, but served as a professional and honorable institution that not only stood above the massacre perpetrated by the SS, but also knew almost nothing about it. . Furthermore, according to Manstein and his followers, the Wermacht not only fought with clean hands, but these men also sowed a myth arguing that if the Wermacht had led the war without Hitler’s interference, Germany would have won. Stein’s book, if for no other reason, is important reading in how it completely dismantles these pernicious myths.

Stein’s work spans decades of German military history. The first half of the book provides an overview of Manstein’s career, then progresses through in-depth research on the major events of his career. These chapters include a look at Manstein’s great military achievements, as well as his mistakes; with the Battle for France, Manstein’s leadership of the Don Army Group, and the German assault on Kursk, including the planning phase, covered in detail. The second half of the book first examines Manstein’s decision to support Hitler and refuse to join the German military resistance movement. The book then describes Manstein’s involvement in the Holocaust, his post-war war crimes trial, and ends up demolishing Manstein’s post-war attempts to present himself in the best light possible.

My complaints with work are minor. Although not an operational or tactical military history, a few more maps would have been helpful. The book covers events that take place across Europe; in particular, some of the mentioned villages in the Soviet Union are obscure even to the well-informed reader. Additional maps could have been of great help in understanding where these events occurred. Also, the editing was somewhat sloppy at times, not enough to detract from the book’s strengths, but enough to be mildly annoying and potentially confusing to someone with only casual knowledge of the War.

Overall, Stein’s book is a valuable addition to the available literature on warfare. Stein’s work fills important gaps in what is widely known about the war, adds to what is being known about Wermacht’s involvement in the Holocaust, and helps to destroy decades of myths that still prevail today; more than sixty years after the end of the war. I recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about Germany and World War II.